

SECRET

Executive Registry

69-842

DD/S 69-0678

10 February 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD**SUBJECT: S. 782 (Ervin Bill--Conversation with Mr. Idar Rimestad)**

1. On 10 February I called Mr. Rimestad and inquired of him as to the position of the Department concerning S. 782, the recently introduced bill by Senator Ervin. While Mr. Rimestad was generally aware of the introduction of this bill he had not personally focused on it nor did he know whether the Department itself had taken any position. He advised that he would make inquiry in the Department as to the Department's consideration of this bill and whether a position had been taken.

2. In a response to Mr. Rimestad's query I advised that we had a serious concern over the provisions of this bill and were hoping that we could work out an exemption for the Agency from the provisions of the bill. I indicated that we were also considering the possibility of suggesting that the bill provide for the President to make an executive determination as to which of the national security agencies should be exempted from the provisions of the bill because of their sensitive security activities.


Signed R. L. Bannerman

R. L. Bannerman
Deputy Director
for Support

cc: Executive Director-Comptroller
General Counsel
✓ Legislative Counsel (Mr. Maury)

Distribution:

Orig - DD/S Subject
1 - DD/S Chrono

SECRET

S. 782 - Specific Problems Affecting the Central Intelligence Agency

Section 1(b), while commendably protecting an employee from compulsory attendance at meetings and lectures on matters unrelated to his official duties, would, for example, make it unlawful for any department or agency to "take notice" of the attendance of one of its employees at a meeting held by a subversive group or organization. While it is doubted that this is the intent of the bill, it clearly is one of the effects of Section 1(b).

Section 1(d), in making it unlawful to require an employee to make any report of his activities or undertakings not related to the performance of official duties, is similar in its effect to Section 1(b). It poses the question of whether the Agency, having discovered that one of its employees is in regular and unreported contact with an intelligence agent or official of a foreign government, would be violating the law in asking the employee for an explanation of this relationship, particularly in the case in which the employee's official duties do not relate to matters involving that particular foreign government. Further, this Section is in conflict with a long-established policy that employees of the Agency must obtain prior approval in making public speeches or writing for publication.

-2-

These and additional restrictions are established to prevent the inadvertent disclosure of sensitive intelligence through employee activities or undertakings not related to official duties. Here again the question arises whether the Agency would be violating the law in exerting control over these activities.

Section 1 (e) deals with psychological testing. S. 782 authorizes the Directors of the FBI, NSA and CIA, or their designees, on the basis of a personal finding in each individual case, to use such tests for the purpose of inquiring into the sensitive areas of religious beliefs and practices, personal family relationships, and sexual attitudes, but it denies the use of such testing to all other departments and agencies without regard to the fact that employees of these departments and agencies may be regular recipients of highly classified information.

Section 1 (f) establishes the same prohibition on the use of the polygraph test as applies to psychological testing, and grants the same partial exemption to the FBI, NSA and CIA. Again, the use of the polygraph test in the proscribed areas is denied to all but these three agencies, irrespective of the fact that highly sensitive positions may be involved.

Section 1(k) poses a problem for the Agency in that it would appear to require the presence of counsel in behalf of an employee as soon as and at the very moment that a supervisor were to ask the employee the reasons for some suspected dereliction of duty ranging from a serious security violation to tardiness in reporting for duty or sloppy work habits. This provision goes to the very heart of the continuous process of review of intelligence operations and activities to determine their effectiveness, the quality of information derived, and professionalism in which the activities were conducted. Out of such interviews or postmortems there naturally evolves the review of individual employee performance which, if unsatisfactory, can readily result in disciplinary action. A great many extremely sensitive intelligence operations and activities are involved in this process and the presence of private counsel in behalf of an employee would raise most serious questions as to the appropriate control and protection of the intelligence information involved. There is no desire that an employee should be deprived of the right of counsel when appropriate, but the wording of this Section would make it "unlawful" to ask the simple preliminary questions which are necessary to establish whether or not there is some failure in performance or dereliction of duty unless provision is made for the presence of counsel if requested by the employee.

Section 4 of the bill would permit any employee or applicant who alleges that an officer of the Executive Branch has violated or threatened to violate provisions of the Act to bring civil action in the district courts. Communist or other subversives acting on their own or on instructions from foreign agents, could file suits for the sole purpose of harassment based on allegations of improper questioning during recruitment interviews. A concerted effort of this nature could seriously impair the orderly recruitment process of the Agency. The will and ability of small minorities to interrupt the normal functioning of both public and private institutions has been amply demonstrated in recent months. There is little doubt that such groups would be quick to recognize and exploit the weapon provided by this Section of the bill.

Section 5. The comments made with respect to Section 4 above are only to a slightly lesser extent equally applicable to Section 5.

Section 6. This Section grants a partial exemption to the FBI, NSA and CIA with regard to financial disclosure and the use of psychological and polygraph testing by requiring each of the Directors, or their designees, to make a personal finding with regard to each individual case that such testing or financial

disclosure is required to protect the national security. If the Agency is to comply with the spirit of the law, it will still be necessary that a personal finding be made in each individual case that such testing or financial disclosure is required to protect the national security. Inquiry by these means into the proscribed areas, which are the key areas of vulnerability, will not be possible as a matter of general regulation.